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Respect and Resistance in Punishment
Theory
Alice Ristropht
INTRODUCTION
As convicted criminals go, Socrates could hardly have been more
accommodating. When his wealthy friend Crito offered to help him escape on
the eve of his execution, Socrates firmly declined.' After he had failed in his
defense against the charges of corrupting Athenian youth, and had suggested to
no avail an alternative penalty (free meals for life, at public expense), Socrates
decided to accept his death sentence without further resistance. Indeed, he was
so helpful as to carry out the execution himself: when the jailer arrived with a
cup of hemlock, Socrates solicited advice on the most efficacious way to ingest
the poison, then obligingly drank to the last drop.2
At the other extreme in his attitude toward punishment-though perhaps
equally suicidal-was Clyde Barrow, the more violent half of the Bonnie and
Clyde criminal team that wreaked havoc across the United States in the early
193Os. 3 Barrow famously vowed that he would never be taken alive; he
promised to resist every effort to apprehend him and, if injured and unable to
escape, to take his own life before allowing lawmen to capture him. Barrow
escaped from jail once, and killed a number of law enforcement officers on
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1. This is the account from Plato's dialogues Apology and Crito. See 1 PLATO, THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO 98-104, 118-22 (R.E. Allen trans., 1984).
2. See I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 229 (Doubleday 1989) (1989).
3. See generally E. R. MILNER, THE LIVES AND TIMES OF BONNIE AND CLYDE (1996).
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separate occasions, before he was finally shot to death by a team of Texas
Rangers and FBI agents in an ambush in Louisiana.4
How much resistance-or accommodation-should we expect from the
convicted criminal? Few convicts are as helpful as Socrates or as intractable as
Clyde Barrow. In many respects, the law makes resistance to punishment
especially costly, by threatening further judicial punishment or, in some cases,
immediate physical harm. Resisting arrest, jumping bail (or "failure to
appear"), and escaping from custody are codified as separate offenses that incur
independent sanctions. 5 In addition, under the phenomenon known as the "trial
penalty," a refusal to plead guilty often results in a more severe sentence for the
underlying offense.6 And, of course, the fact that so many officials within the
criminal justice system are authorized to use guns, clubs, and other instruments
of violence ensures that "most prisoners walk into prison because they know
they will be dragged or beaten into prison if they do not walk.",7 These and
other features of criminal justice policy can be understood as incentives for
those facing punishment to behave more like Socrates than Clyde Barrow.
As a normative matter, it might seem obvious that the legitimacy of
punishment and the illegitimacy of resistance to punishment stand or fall
together. Since, to most observers of the legal system, there is little doubt that
punishment is legitimate (even if the precise basis for that legitimacy is a
subject of perpetual dispute among punishment theorists), it is no surprise that
resistance to punishment is widely viewed as a basis for further condemnation.
It is thus especially curious that one of the most influential political
thinkers in the Anglo-American tradition endorsed a right to resist punishment.
It is all the more surprising that this thinker was Thomas Hobbes, frequently
viewed as a defender of authoritarianism and absolute sovereignty. Hobbes
divided what seems indivisible: he argued that state-imposed punishment was
within the sovereign's proper authority, and yet the individual facing
punishment had a right to resist in any way available. To be sure, the "right" to
resist punishment that Hobbes described is only a "blameless liberty," more
akin to a prepolitical natural right than a legally enforceable claim.8 It would be
4. Id. at 22-25 (describing Barrow's escape from jail); id. at 134 (listing several law
enforcement officers killed by Barrow); id. at 139-143 (describing ambush in Louisiana).
5. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-2 (West 2008) (resisting arrest); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 38.10 (Vernon 2003) (failure to appear); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.06 (Vernon 2003)
(escape).
6. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57
VAND. L. REV. 885, 896 (2004) (describing the trial penalty, or plea discount, and offering
rationales for it). In another effort to punish resistance to punishment, a new proposal would
penalize prisoners who seek DNA testing if the testing provides further evidence of guilt. See
Tonja Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: Forcing Self-Identification in Post-
Conviction DNA Testing, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 263 (2008).
7. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1607 (1986).
8. There are some affinities between a Hobbesian "blameless liberty" and a Hohfeldian
privilege: both entail an option to act, or the absence of a duty to refrain from acting. See Wesley
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nonsensical to require the same sovereign that punishes also to protect the
subject's right to resist. But even if unenforceable, the right to resist
punishment seems to undermine any account of the justification of punishment.
If the state has legitimate authority to punish, how can the subject have a right
to resist?
This Essay explores that question. It is new territory for legal scholarship,
which has produced almost no work on Hobbes's account of punishment.9 One
reason for the neglect may be that Hobbes does not fit easily into either of the
two main camps in punishment theory, retributivism' 0 and consequentialism.
Hobbes rejected the retributive claim that punishment is a moral duty, depicting
it instead as an instrumental effort to achieve deterrence and social stability.
But unlike consequentialist theorists, he did not believe that the benefits of
punishment provided a complete normative justification for the practice. And,
invoking themes dear to many retributivists, Hobbes insisted on basic rights of
due process and decried punishment of innocents. This, I suggest, is reason
enough to read Hobbes on punishment. The continuing inability of retributivists
to silence consequentialists, and vice versa, suggests that as a society, we are
steadfastly committed to both rights and utility. So was Hobbes. Punishment
theory tends to veer toward caricatures in which rights are sacrificed to utility
or vice versa, but Hobbes offered a theory that embraces both while weakening
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE
L.J. 710, 747-50 (1917). A privilege to resist punishment is the absence of a duty to submit to
punishment. Since, unlike rights, privileges do not imply any corresponding duties upon others, a
privilege to resist punishment does not mean that the sovereign has a duty to refrain from
imposing punishment. Cf Michael S. Green, The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and the Right to Rebel Against the State, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 627, 675-80
(1999) (describing the right against self-incrimination in Hobbes as a Hohfeldian privilege). And,
of course, Hobbes does recognize the sovereign's "right" to punish. But Hobbesian rights do not
map neatly onto Hohfeld's categories, as discussed in more detail below. For more on rights as
"blameless liberties" and the inadequacy of Hohfeld, see infra Part II.B.
9. Hobbes is probably overlooked too much by scholars in all areas of law, see infra note
16, but his virtual absence in criminal legal theory is especially striking. A rare exception is
Green, supra note 8, but Green focuses on the privilege not to testify against oneself rather than
the more general right to resist punishment. Theories of punishment from other political
philosophers have fared much better among legal scholars. Law reviews and criminal law
textbooks are rife with references to Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, and occasional appeals
to G.W.F. Hegel or Cesare Beccaria for variety. For just a few of the many available examples,
see Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 Nw.
U. L. REV. 843, 906-07 (2002) (discussing Bentham); id. at 862-63 (Hegel); Charles Fried,
Reflections on Crime and Punishment, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 681, 694-98 (Beccaria); Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1987).
Though Hobbes has been much studied in political theory and philosophy, even in those
fields Hobbes's specific claims about punishment have received little attention in comparison to
other aspects of his work.
10. In this Essay, I use the terms "retributivism" and "retributive arguments"
interchangeably. But for a more nuanced account of the concepts than is required here, see
Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 820 (2007)
(distinguishing between "retributive" theory and "retributivist" theory).
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neither. 1 '
Two additional considerations suggest that punishment theorists should
begin to study Hobbes in greater detail. First, amidst mainstream theories that
view punishment as a morally justified practice, a right to resist is novel,
radical, and potentially disruptive. Taking seriously the right to resist may lead
us to conclude that punishment cannot be fully reconciled with the criteria for
political legitimacy set forth in modem liberal theory. Instead, punishment
creates a dilemma for liberals: physically coercive punishments may be socially
necessary, but they are also acts of violence, persistent traces of the rule of the
stronger in a system otherwise committed to rule by consent. I do not propose
to resolve this dilemma-it is the nature of dilemmas not to be resolved-but if
we were to acknowledge it, we would probably punish differently, and much
less frequently and severely. And even if many contemporary punishment
theorists remain unconvinced by Hobbes's argument, addressing his challenges
should prove fruitful for criminal law scholarship.
More narrowly, the strange notion of a right to resist punishment sheds
considerable light on the issue of respect for criminals. Retributivists have long
argued that we fail to respect the convicted criminal if we punish him for
consequentialist reasons. 12 According to this view, punishment and respect are
compatible only when punishment is imposed as just retribution for the
deserving offender. 13 On the other hand, defenders of consequentialist theories
have argued that they, not the retributivists, properly respect the defendant.
14
Distinct from retributivism as well as the mainstream consequentialist theories,
Hobbes's right to resist offers an alternative and more convincing picture of
what it means to respect someone even as we punish him: we respect the
criminal by acknowledging that punishment, though perhaps justified by
societal interests, is hardly in the condemned man's interest or legitimate from
his perspective. 15 The right to resist grounds an account of punishment that is
11. At the same time, as will become clear below, Hobbes's account of punishment is
markedly different from "hybrid" theories that reconcile retributive and utilitarian aims by
specifying circumstances in which one goal should yield to the other. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson,
Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 19 (1987).
12. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 208, 234 (1986); Herbert Morris,
Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968), reprinted in SENTENCING 93-109 (Hyman Gross
& Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981).
13. See, e.g., MARK TUNICK, HEGEL'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: INTERPRETING THE
PRACTICE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 97-98 (1992) (describing Hegel's theory that punishment
restores mutual recognition and respect).
14. See Christopher, supra note 9, at 967-70; David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of
Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1632-33, 1642-56 (1992).
15. There is some philosophical disagreement as to the relationship between justification
and legitimacy. Many scholars use the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, Political
Legitimacy and Democracy, 112 ETHICS 689, 703 (2002) (equating legitimacy with moral
justification). Others distinguish them: "Legitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to
the past, while justification relates to an end that lies in the future." HANNAH ARENDT, On
Violence, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 151 (1972). Hobbes did not use either term very much and
[Vol. 97:601
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arguably more honest, more egalitarian, and more uniformly respectful than the
familiar retributive and utilitarian accounts.
Since legal theorists do not often give sustained attention to Hobbes, this
Essay begins by highlighting a few key features of Hobbes's political theory
that help establish his contemporary relevance and provide crucial background
for his theory of punishment. Specifically, Part I examines Hobbes's
commitments to equality and individualism as manifested in an inalienable
right to self-preservation; his liberal conception of political authority; and his
adherence to rule-of-law values. Part II turns to punishment specifically. Here I
show how Hobbes's strong commitment to an inalienable right of self-
preservation produces both the sovereign's right to punish and the criminal's
right to resist punishment. Part III suggests that the Hobbesian right to resist
punishment provides a useful conceptualization of what it means to treat
wrongdoers with respect. Some rights of the accused and convicted, I argue,
could be understood as permissible, socially tolerated forms of resistance to
punishment. The concluding Part notes potential objections to Hobbes's
account of punishment, and hopes readers will produce more. Let the
arguments begin.
I
REINTRODUCING THOMAS HOBBES
Though Hobbes is a staple of the political theory canon, he has received
comparatively little attention from contemporary legal theorists. 16 Certain
features of Hobbes's arguments may seem to render him irrelevant to modem
lawyers in constitutional democracies. After seeing his native England go
through bloody civil wars from 1642 to 1651, Hobbes advanced an argument
for absolute sovereignty and explicitly rejected the notion of divided or limited
government. His concerns about domestic unrest and political instability led
him to advocate a degree of governmental power that some commentators have
focused instead on authorization. But I think it is clear that Hobbes would reject efforts to show
that punishment is legitimate, or justified, from the perspective of the person punished. See itnra
Part lI.B.
16. James Boyle asked over twenty years ago, "Why does the standard jurisprudence
course feature Dworkin, Raz, Hart, Kelsen, and Austin as major players, relegating Hobbes to the
introductory parade of venerable, but marginal, jurisprudes?" James Boyle, Thomas Hobbes and
the Invented Tradition of Legal Positivism: Reflections on Language, Power, and Essentialism,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 383, 390 (1987). The contributors to a recent collection on Hobbes's accounts
of law include philosophers and political theorists, but few law professors. HOBBES ON LAW
(Claire Finkelstein ed., 2005). Though legal scholarship rarely directly engages Hobbes's own
ideas, he is frequently cited as providing the inspiration for Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s legal
positivism. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Holmes Versus Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory, in
THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE 158, 175 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000) ("[l]f we are to
understand Holmes as advancing a theory of law at all, that theory is clearly Hobbesian in
character."). Claire Finkelstein has recently argued that the Holmes-Hobbes relationship is
overstated and based on a superficial reading of Hobbes. Claire Finkelstein, Hobbes and the
Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1211 (2006).
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compared to totalitarianism. 17 Perhaps most fundamentally, Hobbes is often
portrayed as a profound pessimist about human nature, as the man who
described the natural condition of mankind as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short."'18 For those who do not share Hobbes's apparent pessimism, his
political theory does not seem particularly compelling.
Though it is impossible to address or defend the full scope of Hobbes's
arguments here, a brief discussion of a few central issues can help demonstrate
his contemporary relevance to punishment theorists. This Part develops three
key points. First, the charge of undue pessimism is misplaced. In fact, as a
result of his great reluctance to blame humans for any of their efforts at
survival, Hobbes displayed more "passionate tenderness" for humans than
some later and supposedly more humane liberal theorists. 19 Second, though
Hobbes unquestionably endorsed absolute sovereignty, his insistence on
consent and authorization as the basis of the sovereign's legitimacy was, and
remains, the cornerstone of the liberal tradition. Third, Hobbes was committed
to familiar liberal legal principles such as due process, notice, certainty, and
predictability, and nowhere are these principles more central to his theory than
in his discussions of punishment.
The short overview of Hobbes's arguments offered here is not intended to
present Hobbes as a model for contemporary policy. Instead, I aim to illuminate
important affinities between Hobbesian thought and key principles of modem
constitutional democracies. Given these affinities, the inattention to Hobbes's
account of punishment is regrettable. While few modem scholars would follow
all the dictates of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism, we would not abandon his
rich discussions of the purposes and best practices of punishment. 20 Similarly,
many thinkers reject Kant's own interpretations of the demands of the
categorical imperative, but we still appreciate that Kantian retributivism has
relevance to contemporary understandings of punishment theory and practice.
21
Hobbes is no less useful as a resource for thinking about punishment.
17. But see Robert P. Kraynak, Hobbes's Behemoth and the Argumentfor Absolutism, 76
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 837 (1982) (acknowledging, and arguing against, the charge that Hobbes's
theory has totalitarian implications).
18. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651). I have modernized
spelling, punctuation, and capitalization for quotations from this text.
19. George Kateb, Hobbes and the Irrationality of Politics, 17 POL. THEORY 355, 385
(1989).
20. For example, Bentham's proposal that poor or homeless persons should be imprisoned
in a "workhouse" (to spare others the disutility of the sight of the poor) and forced to labor may
not be greeted with universal acceptance today. See Jeremy Bentham, Tracts on Poor Laws and
Pauper Management, in 8 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 361, 401 (John Bowring ed. 1843).
21. Kant argued that even if a society were disbanding and individual members were
moving on to other locations, the society should first execute all murderers to "the last murderer
remaining" in order to avoid "blood guilt" and honor the demands of the moral law. IMMANUEL
KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797).
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A. Human Nature
Hobbes famously described human life in the absence of government as
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," 22 and that memorable phrase shapes
the superficial view of Hobbesian political theory. Why, precisely, is life
without a sovereign political authority so miserable? Like other political
philosophers, Hobbes began his theory with a description of the essential
characteristics of human beings. According to Hobbes, those characteristics
are: (1) equal physical vulnerability; and (2) a desire for self-preservation.
Hobbes is the theorist par excellence of human vulnerability. His account
emphasizes that although humans vary in intellectual capacities and in
particular physical strengths, every one of us is vulnerable to violent death.23
No one is so strong or so smart that he will avoid death, or that he can repel any
and all physical assaults coordinated by other human beings. Each person,
aware of his own vulnerability, seeks desperately to secure himself against
danger. Hobbes seemed to infer from vulnerability and the rational desire for
self-preservation a natural right to self-preservation: each person will attempt to
master others "till he see no other power great enough to endanger him," and
"such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a man's
conservation.... ought to be allowed him."24 Each individual must decide for
himself what course of action is most conducive to his self-preservation, and he
may conclude that self-preservation requires not only obviously defensive uses
of violence, but seemingly aggressive and acquisitive actions as well. But if
many different individuals each pursue this strategy of preemptive self-defense,
they will soon come to blows. Accordingly, in the state of nature with no
governing authority, "every man is enemy to every man," and human life is, as
we have said, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.,
25
Hobbes's state of nature is sometimes compared to a prisoner's dilemma,
22. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 89.
23. "[T]he difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can
... claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the
strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself." Id. at 87.
24. Id. at 88. Elsewhere, Hobbes elaborated in greater detail his claim that natural
vulnerability to death implies a right, or "blameless liberty," to do whatever necessary for self-
preservation:
And forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire bonum sibi, that
which is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful; but most of all, the
terrible enemy of nature, death, from whom we expect both the loss of all power, and
also the greatest of bodily pains in the losing; it is not against reason that a man doth all
he can to preserve his own body and limbs, both from death and pain. And that which is
not against reason, men call RIGHT, or jus, or blameless liberty of using our own
natural power and ability. It is therefore a right of nature, that every man may preserve
his own life and limbs, with all the power he hath.
THOMAS HOBBES, ELEMENTS OF LAW NATURAL AND POLITIc 71 (Ferdinand Tonnies ed., 1839)
(1640) [hereinafter HOBBES, ELEMENTS OF LAW]. The term "right," as used here, cannot mean a
legally protected interest, nor does it imply any duties in other people.
25. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 89.
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and indeed, with better communication and coordination, humans might be able
to avoid the misery by cooperating with one another. In fact, the inhabitants of
Hobbes's state of nature do eventually realize that they are all safer if they give
up most of their natural liberty to decide for themselves how to pursue self-
preservation and when to use violence. 26 Each person is more likely to avoid
attack if the discretion over the use of force is concentrated in a single
authority. But until there is such an authority-until there is a sovereign-each
individual must decide for herself how to act to preserve herself. "The right of
nature," then, is "the liberty each man has, to use his own power, as he will
himself, for the preservation ... of his own life"; this right is thus a right "of
doing anything" which he judges to be "the aptest means" of self-
preservation.27
On this account, it is not innate human cruelty or some irresistible
tendency toward gratuitous violence that makes government necessary. Instead,
each person's fundamental drive toward self-preservation leads him to take
defensive actions, which others then perceive as threats to their own
preservation. To appreciate Hobbes, we need not adopt a view of humans as
"dangerous and dynamic" or "rapacious" beings.28 Instead, we need only
recognize that individuals seeking self-preservation will pose threats to one
another. Political authority is necessary not to restrain human brutes from
indulging a natural preference for violence, but to eliminate the good-faith
conflicts that inevitably and understandably culminate in physical violence.
B. Contract and Authority
Hobbes founded the modem social contract tradition, the basic concepts
of which are familiar enough: individuals in a state of nature agree to create a
government for their mutual benefit. Not surprisingly, Hobbes's social contract
sought to solve the particular problems of his state of nature. Since, on his
account, the state of nature is a condition of dangerous plurality in which
diverse individual interests produce preemptive aggression and violence, the
social contract is an effort to reduce disagreement: all individuals "confer all
their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may
reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will. ' 2 9 The sovereign
then "bears" the "person" of the state, and every individual subject
"acknowledge[s] himself to be author of whatsoever he that bears their person
shall act."30 The social contract thus produces "a real unity of them all, in one
26. See id. at 117 (humans form commonwealths to "get[] themselves out from that
miserable condition of war").
27. Id. at 91.
28. See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 61 (George Schwab trans., 1996)
(1927) ("dangerous and dynamic"); LEO STRAuss, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 3
(Elsa M. Sinclair trans., 1963) ("rapacious").
29. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 120.
30. Id.
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and the same person."3 1 The form of the social contract, as Hobbes imagined it,
is a statement by every individual to every other individual: "I authorize and
give up my right of governing myself, to [the sovereign], on this condition, that
you give up your right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner."
32
Put differently, each person renounces her natural right to do absolutely
anything and everything that she believes will contribute to her self-
preservation, in exchange for a similar renouncement by others and in the
hopes that the sovereign thus empowered will protect everyone.
33
Two features of the social contract prove crucial to Hobbes's account of
punishment. First, the right given up by the parties to the contract is the "right
of governing," a right which clearly encompasses some discretion to make and
act on one's own judgments about the best means of self-preservation, but
which is not exactly equivalent to the right to defend oneself against immediate
threats. Hobbes held that the right of self-defense-the right to resist a violent
assault on one's life or bodily safety-was inalienable. 34 Conceptually, perhaps
we can reconcile the renunciation of the right to govern with the inalienability
of the right of self-defense by drawing a distinction between long-term and
immediate self-preservation. In giving up the "right of governing" and agreeing
to obey a sovereign, each person relinquishes the right to subdue or kill all
those who might eventually pose a threat. It is now the sovereign's decision,
not each subject's, how best to prevent death tomorrow. But a knife at one's
throat today, or any other direct threat of immediate bodily harm, leaves no
room for discretion. Consequently, no one gives up the right to resist immediate
threats. Contemporary doctrines of self-defense, which typically incorporate an
"imminence" requirement, may be seen as recognitions of a parallel inalienable
right to use force as necessary for one's immediate safety. 35 Individuals may
use force in self-defense only against a threat of imminent death or serious
bodily harm; self-defense claims based on distant, future threats of harm will
almost always fail.36
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis omitted).
33. Hobbes repeatedly emphasized that the exercise of individual or "private" judgment
would become a threat to social stability. He had sharp criticism for the individual who engages in
the "peremptory pursuit of his own principles, and reasoning," and he counted among the
"diseases of a commonwealth" the "seditious doctrine" that "every private man is judge of good
and evil actions." Id. at 209, 223 (emphasis omitted).
34. "[T]here [are] some rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other
signs, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting
them, that assault him by force, to take away his life .... Id. at 93.
35. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 10.4(d) (2d ed. 2003). Claire Finkelstein has argued that in some circumstances, an acquittal on
the grounds of self-defense can be understood as a recognition that no one can be expected not to
resist a violent assault on one's own person. Claire 0. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational
Excuse, 57 U. Prr. L. REV. 621, 647-49 (1996).
36. Accordingly, many self-defense claims by battered women who kill their abusers have
proved controversial. In the most controversial cases, the battered woman kills her abuser when he
2009]
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A second crucial feature of the social contract is that the sovereign himself
(or itself, if it is an assembly) is not a direct participant in the social contract.
The subjects contract among themselves to recognize and obey the sovereign;
the sovereign promises them nothing. 37 At best, the sovereign might be viewed
as a third party beneficiary to the social contract. This arrangement appears to
produce a sovereign who is above the law, in the sense that he possesses
complete political power and is not himself bound by the laws that he issues.
38
To the limited extent that legal scholars have recognized Hobbes's account of
sovereignty, they have understandably found it inconsistent with contemporary
constitutional democracy. 39 Further, this theory of absolute sovereignty seems
to preclude any rights of resistance or rebellion, including, of course, any right
to resist punishment.
I will say more about the basis of the sovereign's power to punish and the
subject's right to resist in Part II. For the moment, I wish only to emphasize
that notwithstanding Hobbes's defense of a powerful sovereign, his social
contract theory evinces a deep commitment to individualism and other liberal
values.4° Hobbes began his political theory, as we have seen, with an account of
humans as naturally equal and free with an inalienable right to self-
preservation. No one person has any prepolitical right to rule over others; no
one has any right to rule at all unless authorized by those who are to be ruled.
Of course, natural equality and freedom create problems, as each person desires
survival and may pursue it in any fashion she chooses. But the dangerous
results of natural freedom and equality do not diminish the principle that
political authority must originate from the subjects' consent. Hobbes claimed
that individuals would trade obedience for protection, but he insisted that each
individual must make this bargain.41 There is "no obligation on any man"
is sleeping or otherwise not posing an immediate threat. See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense,
Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1993).
37. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 18, at 120 (describing the form of the social contract).
38. See, e.g., id. at 130 (sovereign power must be absolute and indivisible); id. at 184 ("The
sovereign ... is not subject to the civil laws."); id. at 224 ("A fourth opinion, repugnant to the
nature of a commonwealth, is this, That he that has the sovereign power, is subject to the civil
laws."). Hobbes does say repeatedly that sovereigns are accountable to God and "subject to the
laws of nature, because such laws [are] divine." Id. But no human subject can enforce these divine
laws should the sovereign violate them. The aversion to divided or limited government was
doubtless a product of the conflicts Hobbes witnessed within 17th century England.
39. See, e.g., Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on the
Normative Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 181, 185 (2006) (alleging that the
Framers of the United State Constitution knew, and rejected, Hobbes's account of sovereignty).
40. Leo Strauss called Hobbes "the founder of liberalism," defining liberalism as "that
political doctrine which regards as the fundamental political fact the rights, as distinguished from
the duties, of man and which identifies the function of the state with the protection or the
safeguarding of those rights." LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 181-82 (Univ. of Chi.
Press 1971) (1965). Others characterize Hobbes as a "vulgar liberal" or a "kind of liberal." See
RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES 97 (1989) ("a kind of liberal"); Patrick Neal, Vulgar Liberalism, 21 POL.
THEORY 623 (1993).
41. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 491 (stating as the aim of LEVIATHAN "to set before men's
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except those that arise "from some act of his own. ' '42 Today, we may be
skeptical that individuals would consent to the sweeping sovereign power that
Hobbes envisioned, but it remains his claim that the subjects' consent is
required to make any political power valid.
C. The Form of Punishment and the Rule of Law
Perhaps Hobbes's claim that individuals would consent to a powerful
sovereign becomes somewhat more plausible when we consider that in
Hobbes's view, the sovereign could and should operate a political system
governed by the rule of law. In legal scholarship, Hobbes is sometimes
classified as a crude legal positivist who equates law to the commands of the
43
sovereign. Close attention to his discussions of civil law, however, reveals a
more nuanced account. Hobbes made clear that only certain commands may be
counted as law, and civil law is best conceived as a system of rules rather than
standards or ad hoc commands." The rules must be clearly communicated to
the subjects-a law not "made known" is no law at all.45 Indeed, Hobbes
decried the suggestion that judges "make" law themselves.46 He extolled well-
drafted statutes that were communicated "publicly and plainly" to the people.47
Like many contemporary defenders of the rule of law, Hobbes saw consistency,
eyes the mutual relation between protection and obedience"); see also id. at 153 ("The obligation
of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasts, by
which he is able to protect them.").
42. Id. at 150.
43. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the
Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 183-84 (describing, as Hobbes's position, "[tihe only
solution to the problem of civil order is to treat as law only the command of the sovereign.").
Hobbes did often equate law with the command of the sovereign, but his formulations usually
emphasize that laws are the commands of one who has the right to command. See, e.g., HOBBES,
supra note 18, at 111 ("Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over
others.").
44. See HOBBES, supra note 18, at 183 (law is not "a command of any man to any man; but
only of him, whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him"); id. ("Civil law,
is to every subject, those rules, which the commonwealth has commanded him, by word, writing,
or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of, for the distinction of right, and wrong; that is to
say, of what is contrary, and not contrary to the rule.") (emphasis omitted).
45. Id. at 187-88. Hobbes suggests that laws of nature are evident to men through their
own reason, rather than via any sovereign proclamation, but he goes on to explain that all laws,
especially the laws of nature, need to be interpreted. The task of interpretation falls to judges duly
authorized by the sovereign. See id. at 188-92.
46. See THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE
COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (Joseph Cropsey ed., 1971) (1681) [hereinafter HOBBES,
DIALOGUE] ("It is not wisdom, but authority that makes a law."); see also id. at 70-73, 87, 140-42.
One of the principles of English common law that most outraged Hobbes was the (uncodified) rule
that a subject who fled prosecution but later was acquitted would nonetheless forfeit his property.
Though a written statute that criminalized flight from trial would be valid, to seize the property of
innocent subjects without statutory authority was "unchristian and abominable." Id. at 151; see
also HOBBES, supra note 18, at 193.
47. HOBBES, DIALOGUE, supra note 46, at 71.
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continuity, and predictability as virtues of a stable legal code.48 John Rawls
went so far as to label a basic conception of the rule of law-"an authorized
public interpretation of rules supported by collective sanctions"-as "Hobbes's
thesis.
, 49
Rule-of-law values are especially important to Hobbes's definition of
punishment. This definition identifies four essential elements to punishment:
(1) it must be a harm (or "evil"); (2) this harm must be inflicted by public
authority; (3) it must be inflicted on someone who has been judged, by public
authority, guilty of a violation of the law; and (4) it must be inflicted "to the
end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience." 50 If
any of these requirements are not met, the harm is a "hostile act" other than
punishment. 51 Put differently, punishment properly so called is imposed by the
right person, on the right person, for the right reasons.
52
At this level of generality, Hobbes's account of punishment does not
depart dramatically from modem liberal theories of punishment in form or
purpose. Like consequentialists, Hobbes insisted that punishment must be
aimed at social benefits, and like liberal retributivists, Hobbes stated clearly
that only those who have violated a law should be punished: "all punishments
of innocent subjects ... are against the law of nature" and can bring "no good
to the commonwealth., 53 Moreover, Hobbes required a system of familiar
procedural rights. His criminal justice system would adhere to the principle of
legality (no punishment without law), require notice, prohibit forced
confessions, and guarantee due process, including an opportunity to be heard
before a judge.5 4
But here the similarities to mainstream punishment theory end. The
purpose of punishment and its formal structure are two distinct inquiries, and
both are distinguishable from the question of the normative justification of
punishment. 55 As familiar as the purpose and structure of Hobbes's punishment
48. For further discussion of Hobbes's rule-of-law values and their particular application in
the context of punishment, see Mario A. Cattaneo, Hobbes's Theory of Punishment 275, 277 in
HORBES STUDIES (K.C. Brown ed., 1965).
49. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 211 (2d ed. 1999) (1971).
50. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 214.
51. Id. at 215.
52. See id. at 214-15. Arguably, Hobbes is not strictly a positivist here; the limitation of
"punishment" to properly intentioned harms introduces a normative element to his defmition of
punishment.
53. Id. at 219. 1 mean only to point out the compatibility between Hobbes and retributive
theory. Hobbes himself was no retributivist, see infra notes 10 1-102 and accompanying text, and
in general one need not be a retributivist to object to punishing the innocent. See Alice Ristroph,
Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 273 n.31 (2005).
54. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 99 (rejecting testimony obtained through torture); id. at 151
(no man shall be compelled to accuse himself); id. at 203-04 (no ex post facto laws); id. at 218
(right to judicial hearing).
55. Cf Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437,
439-41 (distinguishing between functions of punishment and theories of punishment).
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system are, on the question of justification, he gave an answer quite different
from those given by contemporary punishment theorists.
II
PUNISHMENT PUZZLES
There is little doubt that punishment is a political necessity in Hobbes's
commonwealth. The importance of punishment is evident in Hobbes's famous
claim that "covenants, without the sword, are but words," and perhaps in his
quip that in matters of government, "clubs are trump." 56 But there is an
apparent contradiction at the center of Hobbes's account of punishment:
punishment is a "right" of the sovereign and an exercise of legitimate authority,
yet it is at the same time an act of violence that the condemned individual has a
"right" to resist. This contradiction needs investigation.
A. The Right to Punish
Hobbes began his discussion of punishment in Leviathan with an inquiry
"of much importance": "by what door the right or authority of punishing...
came in."57 As soon as he posed the question, Hobbes rejected the possible
answer that individuals consent to be punished as part of the social contract:
"no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to resist violence; and
consequently it cannot be intended that he gave any right to another to lay
violent hands upon his person." 58 Punishment is a form of violence, and as we
have already seen, Hobbes recognized an inalienable right to resist violent
assaults.59 Accordingly, the commonwealth's right to punish "is not grounded
on any concession... of the subjects., 60
Instead, the right to punish is a manifestation of the sovereign's right to
self-preservation:
[B]efore the institution of commonwealth, every man had a right to
every thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own
preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto.
And this is the foundation of that right of punishing, which is exercised
in every commonwealth. For the subjects did not give the sovereign
that right; but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his
own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it
was not given, but left to him, and to him only .... 61
Thus, in Hobbes's view, an individual's natural right to do violence as he
judges necessary for his own security becomes, in civil society, the sovereign's
56. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 117; HOBBES, DIALOGUE, supra note 46, at 140.
57. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 214.
58. Id.
59. See supra Part I.B.
60. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 214.
61. Id.
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right to punish. More precisely, the natural right to use violence preemptively,
even against someone who does not pose an imminent threat, becomes the right
to punish. Everyone but the sovereign renounces this right when they agree to
the social contract. Only the sovereign-who is not a party to the social
contract-retains the broad discretion to use force, and so only the sovereign
may punish. Notice that Hobbes did not claim that every lawbreaker poses an
immediate threat to the life or bodily well-being of the sovereign. Nevertheless,
a ruler might judge that his own long-term security, and the security of society
as a whole, requires him to use force against those who break the law.
Thus, one way to understand the sovereign's right to punish is to view it
as a manifestation of the right of self-preservation that belongs to all natural,
mortal humans. But this produces a new puzzle. Even if the sovereign is also a
natural person, as would be the case in Hobbes's preferred form of government
(an absolute monarchy), the right to punish as a natural right could only belong
to the natural person, the man who happens to be king, and not to the artificial
person of the sovereign. The sovereign is a creation of the social contract, an
artificial man springing into existence by fiat ("Let us make man") at the
moment of covenant.62 If no commonwealth, and thus no sovereign, exists in
the state of nature, it makes little sense to say the sovereign keeps rights that he
possessed in the state of nature.
This tension can be alleviated, if not entirely dispelled, by examining
more closely Hobbes's state of nature. "State of nature" is a term of art that
refers to neither a single historical moment nor a purely hypothetical construct.
Instead, the state of nature is the always-possible situation in which political
authority is absent. Because political authority might appear, disappear, and
reappear, the state of nature is a recurrent circumstance. Indeed, one could
identify various kinds of states of nature. For example, one could distinguish
between the state of nature in which no political authority has ever been
established ("the original state of nature") and a state of nature in which
political authority has been established but has failed or been destroyed ("a
recurrent state of nature").63 One could also distinguish between a state of
nature in which political authority exists nowhere ("a universal state of nature")
and a state of nature in which political authority, otherwise intact, has been
rejected only by a single individual ("a specific state of nature"). 64
62. Id. at 10.
63. Hobbes did not use these names for various states of nature, but he clearly
contemplated the possibility that subjects could return to a state of nature after an established
political authority collapsed. Id. at 154 ("If a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty, both for
himself, and his heirs; his subjects return to the absolute liberty of nature .... ").
64. Again, these are not Hobbes's phrases. But one may find support for this
conceptualization in Hobbes's discussion of criminals who, having resisted the sovereign and
drawn the threat of punishment, may band together to defend themselves collectively against the
still-existing sovereign. The sovereign remains a sovereign for his law-abiding subjects, but vis-A-
vis the band of criminals the sovereign is simply an aggressor in a state of nature. See id. at 152.
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Conceptually, then, punishment is a distinctive species of violence in that it
takes place in a recurrent, specific state of nature, not an original or universal
one. Once a subject has disobeyed the sovereign, he and the sovereign are in
the state of nature vis-A-vis each other. The sovereign, a uniquely political and
artificial construct, now exists in a version of the state of nature, and he
possesses the broad right of mortal beings to do whatever seems necessary to
preserve himself from imminent or future threats. 65 But if this is all punishment
is-a conflict between two mere mortals in the state of nature-then both the
sovereign and the criminal will have equal rights of self-preservation, and the
criminal has as much right to resist punishment as the sovereign has to impose
it. In fact, this is exactly Hobbes's claim.
B. The Right to Resist
We have just seen that the sovereign's power to punish is derived from the
natural right to use force as a means of self-preservation. When the law has
been broken, the criminal has rejected the sovereign's authority and returned
himself and the sovereign to a version of the state of nature. 66 Hobbes's radical
egalitarianism committed him to the claim that in the absence of a reciprocally
recognized third party to adjudicate disputes, each individual has an equal
claim to preserve himself by whatever means he believes necessary. This gives
the sovereign a right to punish, but it also gives any individual facing
punishment a right to resist.
When Hobbes imagined the general covenant by which individuals
authorize the sovereign, he did not include any explicit reservations other than
the condition that others also grant authority to the sovereign: "I authorize and
give up my right of governing my self, to this man, or to this assembly of men,
on this condition, that you give up your right to him, and authorize all his
actions in like manner." 67 But there is a further, implicit reservation in this
grant of authority: the right to defend one's body from immediate harm.
Remember, the right to resist a knife at one's throat is inalienable. 68 And this
inalienable right is the basis of the right to resist punishment.69 Perhaps Hobbes
considered this reservation so obvious that it did not need to be stated
65. Even with this elaboration of the states of nature, the claim that the right to punish is a
manifestation of a natural right to self-preservation is perplexing. I noted above that Hobbes seems
to view the fact of mortality, and the desire for self-preservation, to imply in humans a right to
self-preservation. But it is not clear why sovereigns-who are not obviously mortal beings-
would have a similar right.
66. I do not mean to suggest that every crime is a profound political statement. I mean
simply that the criminal has put himself and the sovereign into a conflict with no mutually
recognized third-party adjudicator.
67. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 120.
68. See supra Part I.B.
69. For a similar reading, and a detailed argument for the inalienability of the right to resist
force, see Yves-Charles Zarka, Hobbes and the Right to Punish, in HOBBES-THE AMSTERDAM
DEBATE 71 (Hans Blom ed., 2001).
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expressly, and perhaps he was correct. To state the reservation expressly, the
subject would have to say, "I authorize you to do whatever you think necessary
to preserve me, but I reserve the right to resist should you attempt to destroy
me."7 °
On at least two occasions, Hobbes imagined the specific form of the
authorization of punishment. Each time, he was explicit that this authorization
must include a reserved right to resist. Hobbes states in the Leviathan, "For
though a man may covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot
covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill
me."7 1 This right to resist belongs to the guilty as well as the innocent.72
Hobbes makes the same point at greater length in De Cive: "No man is obliged
by any contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill, wound, or
any other way hurt his body .... It is one thing, if I promise thus: if I do it not
at the day appointed, kill me. Another thing, if thus: if I do it not, though you
should offer to kill me, I will not resist." 73 If it seems impossible that one
person should have a right to kill and the second should have a right to resist,
note that this is exactly the situation of the state of nature. When an individual
promises to obey a sovereign, he removes himself from the state of nature. If he
later rejects the sovereign's authority and disobeys the sovereign's commands,
all bets are off; the individual and the sovereign are in the state of nature again
vis-A-vis each other-what I called above the "specific state of nature."
It should be clear by now that Hobbesian rights do not imply correlative
duties. The sovereign's right to punish does not imply that the individual
70. Of course, Hobbes does not allow the subject to say to the sovereign, "I think your
national security policy is lunacy and surely inadequate to protect me, so I am going to resist you
violently," or, "These tax rates are killing me; I am going to rebel." As explained above, we can
distinguish between a strategy of long-term self-preservation on one hand and preservation of the
body from immediate threats on the other hand. We give the sovereign complete authority over
the former; we are not allowed to second-guess his strategy. Since protection from immediate
threats is necessary to long-term preservation, we expect the sovereign to protect us from
immediate threats as well. But if he fails to do so, we are free to do our best to ensure our own
immediate self-preservation.
71. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 98.
72. Id. at 152.
73. HOBBES, DE CIVE, OR THE CITIZEN 39-40 (Sterling P. Lamprecht ed., 1949) (1651).
Two passages in LEVIATHAN sometimes lead commentators to argue that Hobbesian subjects do
consent to be punished. In rejecting a general right of revolution, Hobbes claimed that "if he that
attempts to depose his sovereign be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his
own punishment, as being by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do." HOBBES, supra
note 18, at 122. Hobbes later expanded this argument: "[B]ecause every subject is by this
institution author of all the actions, and judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows, that
whatsoever [the sovereign] does, it can be no injury to any of his subjects." Id. at 124. The second
of these passages is easy to reconcile with the right to resist punishment if we remember that
Hobbes defines "injury" as a breach of contract, see id. at 104, and it is clear that the sovereign
breaches no contract in imposing punishment. Punishment damages the subject, see id. at 120, but
it does not injure him. The discussion of efforts to depose a sovereign is more challenging, but it is
clear from other passages that the right to resist extends even to punishment for treason or
rebellion. See id. at 152.
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subject has a duty to submit to punishment, and the individual's right to resist
punishment does not imply the sovereign has a duty to refrain from punishing.
In other words, these are not Hohfeldian "claim rights."74 The rights to punish
and to resist punishment bear some resemblance to what Hohfeld called
privileges-legal options to act, unburdened by duties owed to others. But
Hobbesian rights are not exactly Hohfeldian privileges, since Hohfeld
understood privileges to imply a correlative "no-right" in others.75 Indeed,
Eleanor Curran has recently suggested that a close study of Hobbes reveals
inadequacies in Hohfeld's framework.76 Whatever we make of Hohfeld, the
critical point here is that Hobbesian rights imply no correlative duties. They are
instead "blameless libert[ies]. 77 The preeminent natural right, according to
Hobbes, "is the liberty each man has, to use his own power, as he will himself,
,,78for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life. The
sovereign's right to punish and the subject's right to resist are both
manifestations of that natural right.
Even in the absence of right-duty correlations, there is a sense in which
Hobbes's recognition of a right to resist punishment is related to his claim that
penal power is not grounded on the consent of those who may face punishment.
A desire for security or self-preservation provides the motivation to grant
power to the sovereign in the first place, 79 and whatever else preservation of a
person might require, it cannot require that person's destruction. This reasoning
may seem to support at most a right to resist capital punishment, but Hobbes
explicitly recognized a right to resist imprisonment and other non-capital
punishments. Since "a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that
assault him by force," no one can be understood to have abandoned or
transferred the right to resist "wounds, and chains, and imprisonment."8 0 He
reasoned that there was "no benefit consequent" to the one who suffered these
non-capital punishments, and one who allows himself to be physically
restrained puts himself at the mercy of his captor. Again, "[i]f the sovereign
74. See Hohfeld, supra note 8, at 717 (defining claim rights as those with correlative
duties); see also Claire Finkelstein, A Puzzle About Hobbes on Self-Defense, 82 PAC. PHIL. Q.
332, 358 (2001) ("Hobbes's right to self-defense is a mere liberty right, rather than a full-fledged
claim right. That is, it is a right that places no one under a correlative duty of non-interference.").
75. Hohfeld, supra note 8, at 710, 747-50.
76. See Eleanor Curran, Lost in Translation: Some Problems with a Hohfeldian Analysis of
Hobbesian Rights, 19 HOBBES STUD. 58 (2006).
77. "[T]hat which is not against reason, men call RIGHT, orjus, or blameless liberty of
using our own natural power and ability. It is therefore a right of nature, that every man may
preserve his own life and limbs, with all the power he hath." HOBBES, ELEMENTS OF LAW, supra
note 24, at 71.
78. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 91.
79. Id. at 93.
80. Id.
81. Id. Claire Finkelstein has argued that "surely it would sometimes be beneficial for me
to lay down the fight to resist him who wounds me, puts me in chains or imprisons me," and
suggests that it might sometimes be worthwhile to sell one's right to resist. Finkelstein, supra note
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command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or maim himself,
or not to resist those that assault him . . .yet hath that man the liberty to
disobey."
82
To fully understand the right to resist, however, one must also understand
its limits. Three caveats are important. First, the right to resist hardly amounts
to an endorsement of criminal activity. Hobbes viewed crime as irrational
action, produced by "some defect of the understanding or some error in
reasoning." 83 He did not claim that every lawbreaker was insane, but did
maintain that crime resulted from a miscalculation about the individual's own
interests. Ex ante, self-preservation is best realized by obeying the sovereign's
commands. It is only ex post, after the individual has already disobeyed, that
self-preservation may require resistance to punishment.84 Second, as I have
already emphasized, the right to resist is not a legally enforceable claim, but
rather a "blameless liberty." 85 Resistance to punishment is perfectly human and
understandable-as George Kateb has put it, Hobbes seemed to wonder, "With
what right, with what possible authority, could anyone require a fellow creature
not to try to preserve itself?" 86 But no one is obliged to assist the resisting
criminal. The sovereign is certainly not obliged to cease his attempts to punish.
Third and finally, it is only the right to defend oneself from immediate threats
that is inalienable. According to Hobbes, persons could and should give up the
discretion to defend others from distant or immediate threats, including the
threat of punishment. 87 Though I never authorize the sovereign to punish me, I
74, at 338-39. Whatever notion of self-interest motivates Finkelstein's claim, it is not Hobbes's.
Hobbes would probably acknowledge that it may sometimes serve a person's interest to decline to
resist. But to renounce permanently the right to resist is tantamount to saying, "I am not and never
will be the best agent of my own preservation; I bargain that my interests in preservation are best
served by granting you complete discretion over my continued existence." Hobbes would see such
a bargain as deeply irrational, and I am inclined to agree. It should be noted that according to
Hobbes, rational human beings care not simply about being preserved, but about self-preservation.
They are agents of their own security, not mere passive recipients of protective services.
82. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 151.
83. Id. at 202.
84. But Hobbes would acknowledge that depending on the sovereign's capacity to
apprehend the criminal and the specific nature of the threatened punishment, it may sometimes be
more rational to submit than to resist. See infra Conclusion.
85. See supra note 77. The right to resist punishment may be, as David Gauthier has
described the right to self-defense, "beyond the law." David Gauthier, Self-Defense and the
Requirement of Imminence: Comments On George Fletcher's Domination in the Theory of
Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 615, 616 (1996). "A legal system which failed to
recognize the right, which failed to recognize the justification each person has to act in her own
protection in the light of imminent danger, could have no valid claim on the allegiance or
obedience of those it sought to bring within its sway." Id.
86. Kateb, supra note 19, at 385.
87. HOBBES, supra note 18, at 152 ("To resist the sword of the commonwealth, in defense
of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man has liberty.") (emphasis added). An apparent
exception to this rule is the circumstance in which several criminals, all facing punishment, join
forces and resist the sovereign collectively.
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can (and should, according to Hobbes) authorize the sovereign to punish you. s8
C. Implications for Punishment (and Political) Theory
Hence punishment may be within the sovereign's broad authority, but
from the criminal's perspective, it remains a violent threat to safety and
freedom. On this account, punishment is regrettable but necessary; equally
necessary is the right to resist. Some commentators have found this apparent
contradiction-the claim that the sovereign is authorized to punish and the
simultaneous claim that punishment is violence that even guilty subjects have a
right to resist-to be fatal to Hobbes's political theory.89 In one scholar's
dramatic language, "The mighty Leviathan, King of the Proud, is still-bo....
[T]here being no 'door,' nor any 'Right, or Authority of Punishing' to come
through it, there is no sovereign, hence no commonwealth." 90 Arguably, if the
right to resist punishment is inalienable, then Hobbes's "punishment dependent
political theory is in trouble." 91 Beyond the apparent inconsistency, scholars
find troubling the apparent equanimity with which Hobbes viewed the struggle
between the punisher and the punished.
92
In fact, Hobbes was not indifferent about the outcome of the conflict
between the sovereign's right to punish and the criminal's right to resist. It is
true that in relation to one another, the sovereign and the criminal each have a
"blameless liberty" to use violence for self-preservation. But the sovereign's
violence is not exactly equivalent to the resisting criminal's. In addition to the
right to punish-the natural right to use violence-the sovereign also holds the
authority to punish.93 That is, the sovereign has been authorized by other
88. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION, 197-207
(1986). Other scholars, such as Deborah Baumgold, are less troubled by the implications of the
right to resist, because they conclude that resistance will be ineffective: the sovereign's superior
power is almost certain to prevail. DEBORAH BAUMGOLD, HOBBES's POLITICAL THEORY 29 (1988)
(claiming that Hobbes grants the right to resist only because it is "politically irrelevant").
Remember, the right to resist is only a "blameless liberty," not a legally enforceable claim.
Hobbes does not imagine that any government entity will honor and enforce the individual's right
to resist punishment. That would be nonsensical. Rather, the right to resist punishment simply
means that we should not be surprised if the condemned man fights back, nor can we say that he is
wrong to do so.
90. Thomas S. Schrock, The Rights to Punish and Resist Punishment in Hobbes's
Leviathan, 44 POL. RES. Q. 853, 886-87 (1991).
91. Id. at 854. Leo Strauss also notes the tension between a right to punish and a right to
resist, but does not seem to view it as fatal to Hobbes's theory. STRAUSS, supra note 40, at 197.
92. Thomas Schrock contrasts the resisting criminal to Odysseus, who ordered his men to
tie him to the mast and yet still resisted the bonds: "If Odysseus had broken the bonds and gone
straightway to the Sirens, Homer would have recorded a moral loss. By contrast, if [the person to
be punished] successfully resists and escapes, Hobbes finds no moral loss, even if the defendant is
guilty of the crime for which he had beforehand authorized the sovereign to 'Kill me."' Schrock,
supra note 90, at 878.
93. It is clear that "right" and "authority" are not always interchangeable in Hobbes's
theory. At least some rights are natural, but all authority is artificial. Every person has rights in the
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subjects to punish on their behalf. The criminal himself has not authorized his
own punishment, as indicated above, but other subjects have authorized the
discretionary use of force employed by the sovereign to punish the disobedient
subject.94 It is possible that Hobbes did not see a moral distinction between the
sovereign's successful punishment and the criminal's successful resistance, as
morality had little relevance to Hobbes's state of nature. 95 But there is clearly
an important political distinction between the punishing sovereign and the
resisting criminal: the sovereign acts with political authority and for the benefit
of other citizens, but the criminal acts for himself alone.
Perhaps we should view the coexistence of the right to punish and the
right to resist as an indication of Hobbes's awareness that diverse human
interests can be reconciled only imperfectly. Even with the best intentions, the
sovereign will not in fact serve the interests of everyone he represents--or at
any rate, some members of his constituency will believe him not to serve their
interests, and they will disobey his commands. If I am one of the disobedient, it
may be the case that societal preservation requires that I be jailed or put to
death-but it can never be the case that my own self-preservation requires my
imprisonment or execution. 96 Hobbes made clear that when the sovereign has to
choose between his own preservation (upon which depends the preservation of
the society as a whole) and the preservation of an individual subject, the
sovereign will and should sacrifice the subject. But he did not impose an
obligation on the subject to go down quietly. This is what separates him from
most contemporary liberal theorists, and what makes his theory so radical and
potentially disruptive today: he did not believe that a consent-based theory of
government could produce a duty to submit to punishment.
Hobbes's theory of punishment combines deep individualism and
egalitarianism, which produce the right to resist, with a consequentialist
concern for security and safety.97 At times, he has been compared to
state of nature, regardless of what other persons do, say, or think. But persons-note the plural-
must create relationships of authority. As Hanna Pitkin points out, the person who attempts to
establish authority all by himself is, for Hobbes, a fraud. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 23 (1972); see also HOBBES, supra note 18, at 113. Hobbes himself
seemed to finesse this point by asking, "[B]y what door the right or authority of punishing in any
case came in." Id. at 214.
94. Cf GAUTHIER, supra note 88, at 148 ("Each man authorizes, not his own punishment,
but the punishment of every other man. The sovereign, in punishing one particular individual,
does not act on the basis of his authorization from that individual, but on the basis of his
authorization from all other individuals.").
95. Hobbes argued that it did not make sense to speak in moral terms-of right and wrong,
or good and bad-until there was a commonly recognized authority to settle moral disagreements.
Many contemporary theorists follow this line of reasoning to defend democratic decision-making
procedures. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
96. I leave aside civil commitment for the mentally incapacitated.
97. The important individualist and egalitarian claims of Hobbes's account are neglected in
a recent discussion by Corey Brettschneider. According to Brettschneider, Hobbes thought it
unnecessary to justify punishment to the criminal; criminals were "enemies" of society and as
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retributivists, 98 and at times to utilitarians. 99 But his theory should not be
confused with contemporary "hybrid theories" that seek to reconcile
retributivism with utilitarianism. Hybrid theories draw upon multiple
justifications of punishment to determine the appropriate distribution of
penalties. A typical hybrid approach holds that moral desert specifies a range of
permissible penalties, and utilitarian considerations should drive the selection
of the appropriate penalty within that range.' 00 Hobbes had little to say about
the severity of punishments, and what he did say was explicitly
consequentialist. 0'I Desert plays no role in Hobbes's theory; indeed, he stated
as a law of nature that "we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other
design, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others."'
10 2
More fundamentally, Hobbes's account of punishment is unusual in its
modesty and its open acknowledgment of its own limitations. It does not claim
that anyone consents to be on the receiving end of superior physical force. It
does not claim to have transformed the exercise of such force into a cause for
moral celebration or self-congratulation. It does not pretend that we punish
prisoners for their benefit rather than our own. 103 It does not claim, as some
retributive theories do, that when we incarcerate or execute prisoners, we act
like God and "plant the flag of truth within the fortress of a rebel soul.' 10 4 It
such, "unworthy" of arguments justifying the use of force against them. Corey Brettschneider, The
Rights of the Guilty: Punishment and Political Legitimacy, 35 POL. THEORY 175, 176, 179 (2007).
But Hobbes did not argue that justifying punishment to the criminal is unnecessary; rather, his
claim was that this task is impossible. I do not think Hobbes was indifferent to the fact that
criminals are subject to violent responses from the state. He simply refused to assuage lingering
discomfort about this violence by pretending that the criminal has consented to it.
98. See Alan Norrie, Thomas Hobbes and the Philosophy of Punishment, 3 L. & PHIL. 299,
314 (1984) ("It is because of Hobbes's contractualist framework that his work exhibits a
retributivist tendency.").
99. See Cattaneo, supra note 48, at 289 ("Hobbes's conception contains in essence the
basic principles of a utilitarian theory of punishment .... ).
100. See, e.g., Norval Morris, Desert as a Limiting Principle, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING
201 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992); Robinson, supra note 11, at 38-39.
101. Hobbes claimed that punishments must be sufficiently severe to deter illegal action:
"If the harm inflicted be less than the benefit, or contentment that naturally follows from the crime
committed, that harm is not within the definition [of punishment] and is rather the price, or
redemption ... because it is of the nature of punishment, to have for end, the disposing of men to
obey the law .. " HOBBES, supra note 18, at 215.
102. Id. at 106; see also id. at 240 ("[T]he end of punishment is not revenge, and discharge
of choler; but correction, either of the offender, or of others by his example ... ").
103. Hobbes might have enjoyed Cool Hand Luke, the film in which Luke Jackson, played
by Paul Newman, repeatedly resists punishment by escaping a rural prison. When Luke is
captured and returned to the prison after one escape attempt, a prison captain has him shackled
and advises him never to stop listening to the sound of his chains, "because they gonna remind
you of what I've been sayin'-for your own good." Luke replies, "I wish you'd stop being so
good to me, Cap'n." COOL HAND LurE (Warner Brothers 1967).
104. The phrase comes from C.S. Lewis, who explains that God inflicts pain on humans
not to be cruel, but to awaken them to their sins and to the truth. C.S. LEWIs, THE PROBLEM OF
PAIN 95 (Macmillian Co. 1965) (1940). Retributive theorists have adopted this phrase. See Jean
Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS I (Wesley
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does not claim that incarceration offers prisoners an education in virtue.10 5 It
does not claim, as some utilitarian theories do, that harm to the interests of
discrete individuals may be made to disappear into aggregate social benefits.
The Hobbesian theory of punishment does not promise that we can punish
"without remainder"; nor does it claim that the right punishment restores the
balance, sets the world right, and leaves no place for regret.'0 6 In the Hobbesian
view, the need for physical force demonstrates a failure of persuasion and
consent. Persuasion and consent will fail on occasion, and force will be
necessary, but we are all better off when consent succeeds and subjects obey.
In Hobbes's theory, punishment is at best incompletely authorized and
imperfectly legitimate. The punishing sovereign acts with authority, but only
with the authorization of those subjects who are not themselves punished. In
relation to the condemned, the sovereign can claim only the natural right to use
violence, so punishment is never fully representative. There is always a trace of
the violence of the state of nature-and the rule of the stronger-in physical
punishment. These considerations did not lead Hobbes to reject the practice of
punishment, and they are hardly reason for us to raze the prisons. But they
create a less tidy account of punishment than what is promised by most
contemporary theories. Punishment is a practice that leaves the hands of the
punisher a bit dirty. 10 7 1 suggest in the next Part that we must keep in mind the
imperfect legitimacy of punishment if we are to treat criminals with respect.
III
RESPECT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE GUILTY
A. Rationalizing Defendants' Rights
As odd as a right to resist punishment may sound to contemporary ears,
American law does, of course, recognize other rights of accused persons-
Cragg ed., 1992); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 718 n.80 (1981).
105. "[T]he virtue ethics theory of punishment takes the principal justifying purpose of the
criminal law to be the inculcation of virtue or habituation to virtue." Kyron Huigens, Street Crime,
Corporate Crime, and Theories of Punishment: A Response to Brown, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
1, 11 (2002) (footnote omitted).
106. The philosopher Bernard Williams argued that many situations present us with moral
dilemmas, in which it is not possible to satisfy every morally weighty claim. He used the phrase
"remainders" to describe the "moral oughts" that remain unsatisfied. See BERNARD WILLIAMS,
PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 179 (1973). These remainders are cause for regret-which is not to say
that we would act differently if faced with the dilemma again. "Regret necessarily involves a wish
that things had been otherwise, for instance that one had not had to act the way one did. But it
does not necessarily involve the wish, all things taken together, that one had acted otherwise."
BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 31 (1981). For a
somewhat broader understanding of the term "moral remainder," see BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL
THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 213 n.l (1993).
107. See Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 160 (1973).
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rights seemingly far more useful than the right to resist, perhaps, because they
are legally enforceable.' The arguments advanced in favor of these rights may
be roughly divided into instrumental justifications, which typically urge that the
rights of the accused are essential to the sorting mechanism by which guilty
persons are convicted and the innocent go free, and deontological claims about
the inherent moral worth of every person.' 0 9 I suggest that Hobbes's theory of
punishment can inspire a third way to conceptualize the rights of the accused.
Closer to the deontological justifications, but not dependent on any particular
account of moral duty, this neo-Hobbesian account explains defendants' rights
as weaker relatives of the right to resist punishment.' l0 Moreover, the right to
resist helps us conceptualize what it means to respect a criminal even as we
punish him. Respect requires, among other things, an acknowledgment that
punishment is at odds with the rational self-interest and the human dignity of
the condemned. We respect accused persons by acknowledging their (non-
legally-enforceable) right to resist punishment, and perhaps by recognizing a
diluted version of this "blameless liberty" in the enforceable claim rights of
criminal defendants.
Before examining defendants' rights as derivative of the right to resist
punishment, it is worth noting that existing defenses of these rights often seem
incomplete or unsatisfying. When the complaint is made, as it often is, that
criminal defendants have "too many rights," a typical rejoinder is that
defendants' rights are essential to a truth-seeking adversarial process in which
guilty persons will be convicted and innocent ones will go free.' For example,
the defendant's right to present evidence in her own defense (which the
Supreme Court has characterized as an essential element of due process) 112
helps ensure that jurors or judges can consider all relevant information before
making a factual determination of guilt. That a right to present evidence would
108. The United States is hardly the only country to recognize rights of the accused, but it
is usually viewed as having, at least on paper, an especially broad conception of defendants'
rights. For discussions of defendants' rights in comparative perspective, see Mirjan Damaska,
Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1975) and
Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004).
109. For a catalogue of instrumental and rights-based arguments for the privilege against
self-incrimination in particular, see Green, supra note 8, at 640-68.
110. As becomes clear below, this account is loosely Hobbesian, but it is not Hobbes's own
view. I do not argue that Hobbes himself would defend legally cognizable defendants' rights such
as those nominally protected in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution.
11. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Johnnie L. Cochran Jr., Debate, Do Criminal
Defendants Have Too Many Rights?, 33 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1193, 1196-97 (1996) (Amar arguing
that the criminal justice system provides rights that "benefit the guilty without helping the
innocent"); id. at 1198 (Cochran arguing that the rights of the accused are necessary to protect
innocent defendants).
112. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a
criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in
one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.").
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contribute to truth-seeking is simple and intuitive enough. Scholars have
developed far more complex arguments to explain how other rights of the
accused, such as the right to remain silent, also protect innocent defendants and
the truth-seeking mission of the criminal justice process."13 Whatever the
precise argument, the refrain of these justifications of defendants' rights
remains the same: legal protections for all defendants serve societal interests in
sorting the guilty from the innocent.
Such arguments for defendants' rights depend on uncertainty as to guilt or
innocence, and they are less persuasive when there is strong evidence of the
defendant's guilt. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule provides a stark
example: under this rule, evidence of guilt is excluded if it was obtained in
violation of certain procedural requirements. Since, presumably, the presence
of incriminating evidence will often correspond with an actually guilty
defendant, the exclusionary rule clearly helps the guilty. For that reason,
commentators have repeatedly urged courts to abandon or circumscribe the
exclusionary rule. 114 Similarly, many commentators-unconvinced by the
claim that the right to silence helps the innocent-have criticized the scope of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." 5 Finally, the
enumerated right that most explicitly protects guilty defendants-the Eighth
Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment-is probably the
least enforced of the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights." 6 Our
constitutional doctrine and political climate have not been welcoming to the
notion of rights for the guilty as opposed to rights for the accused-but-
potentially-innocent.
Occasionally, however, we see a different argument for defendants' rights,
one that invokes the importance of respect for the dignity of all humans-even
guilty ones. As "respect for the offender" has been a theme of retributive
theories of punishment, 1 7 the respect-based account of defendants' procedural
rights is often presented as a specifically retributive theory. Paul Butler has
explained that "[r]etributivists believe that punishment communicates respect
113. See, e.g., Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430 (2000).
114. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES (1997); Robert L. Misner, In Partial Praise of Boyd: The Grand Jury as Catalyst for
Fourth Amendment Change, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 805 (1997) (arguing that the exclusionary rule
"sometimes frees the certainly-guilty").
115. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The
Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2631 (1996) ("[A]s embodied in the United States
Constitution, the privilege against self-incrimination was not intended to afford defendants a right
to remain silent or to refuse to respond to incriminating questions."); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 679-80
(1968).
116. The Supreme Court has often stated that successful Eighth Amendment challenges
are, and should be, rare. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 963 (1991); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1977); see also Ristroph, supra note 53, at 307-14.
117. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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for the criminal by recognizing him as a moral agent," and according to Butler,
the "Bill of Rights codifies the retributive concern for the criminal's
humanity."' 18 Respect can provide a far more stable ground to support rights of
all accused persons than does a concern to protect the innocent or a societal
interest in sorting innocent defendants from guilty ones. But it is worth
elaborating what kind of respect is due to those who break the law-after all,
criminal defendants are more often targets of hatred, fear, revulsion, and
condemnation than objects of respect.
B. Theorizing Respect
Respect means, literally, to look (back) at, but for at least a few centuries,
the word has been used in two different senses. The first simply implies a
neutral acknowledgment--"l will not address any question with respect to the
exam." But in a second, more normatively meaningful sense, respect is a
particular kind of recognition or regard: to respect is to look at with admiration
or deference. This is the sort of respect of which Aretha Franklin sang, and that
Rodney Dangerfield did not get. Respect in this sense is closely associated with
the concepts of equality and dignity. To treat a person with respect is to
acknowledge her, to take her into account, but in a specific way: not to mock
her, but to esteem her. Respect for criminal offenders, as the phrase is usually
invoked today, is simply a subsidiary of a broader liberal commitment to
"respect for persons"-a recognition of the equality and inherent dignity of all
human persons.
But how, specifically, does one punish respectfully? As James Whitman
has chronicled, "respect of persons" was once associated with deeply
inegalitarian practices, and two very different notions of respect have informed
penal practices in England and its former colony, the United States, on one
hand, and continental Europe, on the other. 19 Respect of persons, on the
European continent, meant taking into account the social status of the particular
offender. Respect, in this inegalitarian sense, called upon punishers to treat
offenders according to their pre-criminal social status; upper-class offenders
were addressed more formally and given greater privileges and better treatment
than lower-class offenders.' 20 This notion of "respect of persons" depended on
a discontinuity, not between the guilty and the innocent, but between the upper-
class guilty and the lower-class guilty. As Whitman notes, Blackstone praised
English law over the laws of the European continent precisely because the
English common law imposed punishments "without respect of persons."'
2
'
118. Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 983, 1003 (2004).
119. JAMES WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 41-43 (2003) (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 9-11, 104-07.
121. Id. at 42 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
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In contrast to the inegalitarian "respect of persons," the modem notion of
respectfor persons is strongly egalitarian. It emphasizes the universal dignity of
all humans, criminal or not. We respect the fact that the offender is a person;
we do not privilege him or her based on the particular kind of person he or she
is. According to Whitman, European punishment has moved from a
hierarchical notion of respect to an egalitarian one. Because European countries
once criminalized certain offenses committed almost exclusively by high-status
offenders, such as dueling, they were used to treating at least some offenders
well. It was possible, then, for Europe to "level up" and extend to all offenders
the respect formerly reserved for prisoners from the upper classes. 122 America,
in contrast, has never had a large number of high-status offenders.' 2' The
American criminal justice system is nominally egalitarian among offenders, but
it tends to treat all offenders badly-and as clearly inferior to those without
criminal records. Somewhat counter-intuitively, Whitman argues, the more
socially stratified Europe produced penal systems more deeply committed to
principles of (equal) respect for all prisoners.' 24
When contemporary retributivists refer to respect for criminal offenders,
they invoke the egalitarian model rather than the stratified one. Indeed, some
theorists argue that it is a commitment to equality that requires retributive
punishment in the first place. 125 But this argument often leaves retributivists
with the paradoxical claim that we respect offenders by treating them worse
than we do non-offenders. As formulated by Herbert Morris, all persons must
share equally the benefits and burdens of the law. 126 On this account, we should
understand crime as an attempt by the wrongdoer to exempt himself from the
burdens of self-restraint imposed by the criminal law: by committing a crime,
the criminal gains unfair benefits. Punishment is then required to restore the
equal distribution of benefits and burdens. We restore equality via the
temporary inequality of punishment. In doing so, we recognize the offender as
a responsible moral agent. Morris's argument was framed as a challenge to the
then-popular rehabilitative approaches to punishment. Morris argued that to
view crime as an illness and the criminal as a sick person in need of
rehabilitation is to deny the criminal's autonomy. In contrast, penalties imposed
as just deserts recognize the choice exercised by those who break the law. By
inflicting suffering for those disobedient choices, we recognize them as choices
and thus respect the wrongdoer as a free and autonomous agent.1
27
ENGLAND 370-71 (1979) (1765-69)).
122. See, e.g., id. at 9-11, 125-50.
123. See, e.g., id. at 178.
124. See id. at 191-92.
125. In addition to the works of Herbert Morris and Jean Hampton discussed below, see
Laura Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIo ST. L. J. 1307, 1335-36
(2007); John Finnis, Punishment's Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JuRis. 91, 102 (1999).
126. See Morris, supra note 12, at 95.
127. Id. at 102-05. Though Morris did not mention Hegel, his account closely approximates
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Another version of egalitarian retributivism focuses explicitly on the
relative positions of victim and wrongdoer. Punishment is depicted as "the
infliction of suffering to symbolize the subjugation of the subjugator .... And
the message carried in this subjugation is 'What you did to her, she can do to
you. So you're equal."",128 As inequality is the path to equality in Morris's view,
here disrespect is the path to a balance of respect. The offender himself is
treated with disrespect-he is stigmatized-in order to achieve equality and
respect on a broader social scale.
129
To many ears-including my own-these claims of respectful punishment
ring hollow. 130 It is difficult to see how we can simultaneously stigmatize an
offender and show respect for him; stigma and respect seem fundamentally
incompatible. Morris's account establishes, at most, that punishing for
retributive reasons is marginally more respectful than incarcerating for
rehabilitative reasons-a weak defense of the claim of respectful punishment.
And as Morris himself acknowledged, the egalitarianism of his benefits-and-
burdens claim depends on the premise that prior to the criminal act, the benefits
and burdens of society were in fact equally distributed, a premise that is
probably inaccurate in most existing societies.1 31 Other retributive arguments
are simply circular: they assert that responsible agents must be punished, and
that failure to punish is failure to recognize the criminal as a responsible
agent. 132 In fact, judgments of responsibility and agency are independent of
judgments of how to respond to a responsible agent.' 33 Finally, the retributive
claim that punishment is respectful, especially when defended with
philosophical abstractions or Hegelian metaphysics, seems particularly
inconsonant with contemporary American penal practices. Jails and prisons are
unpleasant places where nearly every aspect of a prisoner's life is subject to
the Hegelian argument that punishment reformulates the offender's criminal act-the violation of
another's freedom-as a universal law and applies it to the offender himself, and for this reason
the imposition of punishment is necessary to respect the offender's rationality. See G.W.F. HEGEL,
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 128 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1820).
128. Hampton, supra note 104, at 13.
129. Id.
130. See Christopher, supra note 9, at 967-70; Dolinko, supra note 14, at 1632-33, 1642-
56.
131. Morris acknowledged that if the initial distribution of benefits and burdens is not
equal, "the difference between law and coercion disappears." Morris, supra note 12, at 103. He
did not himself address whether American society or other existing systems satisfied the equal
initial distribution requirement.
132. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as
Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 260-61 (2009) (arguing that retributive
punishment "communicates to the offender that we are respecting him by holding him responsible
as a moral agent," and stating that a failure to punish may be taken "as a statement of
condescension" to the offender).
133. In other words, unless one is already committed to the retributive view that bad acts
by responsible agents necessarily require a punitive response, one can easily recognize a bad act
as a deliberate choice of a responsible agent and still decline to respond by punishing.
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someone else's control: prisoners are told when (and often, if) they can eat,
sleep, shower, read, work, see visitors, and so on. 13 4 Prisoners are supervised in
the shower and at the toilet, strip-searched on occasion, and at all times
required to obey the orders of prison officials. With respect like this, who needs
insults?
Not everyone will agree that convicted criminals are entitled to any form
of respect at all. But assuming that some measure of respect is appropriate,
retributive respect is hardly satisfactory. It is weak in its aspirations and
unfulfilled in practice. Can Hobbes-not known as a theorist of respect--offer
a more attractive vision? Perhaps Hobbes can remind us of what we should see
when we look at a criminal offender. Hobbes, with his steadfast commitment to
an equal right of self-preservation, would see a vulnerable human being about
to encounter physical force that is almost certain to overwhelm him. To be sure,
this vulnerable being may be a cruel and vicious criminal, a menace to innocent
victims and to society at large. And yet, if we are to respect the offender as a
person, and if we share Hobbes's egalitarian individualism, we will see that the
criminal's nasty acts do not eliminate his right to try to preserve himself. The
right to self-preservation-a "blameless liberty"-is inalienable.
The Hobbesian account of punishment invites a very different conception
of respect for wrongdoers, one more realistic and more compelling than that
provided by retributivists. On this account, punishment is so great an intrusion
on human freedom, dignity, and self-preservation that the only way to respect
the humanity of those we punish is to acknowledge their right to resist. Respect
via the right to resist is similar to claims that individuals should not be forced to
dig their own graves, or supply the rope for their own hangings, or pay for their
executioner's bullets, but it goes further. 135 Hobbesian respect for criminals
refuses to blame humans for acting on the fundamental and rational drive for
self-preservation. In other words, Hobbesian respect would not simply refuse to
require Socrates to drink the hemlock cooperatively. Had Socrates agreed to
escape with Crito, Hobbesian respect would have recognized this action as a
blameless exercise in self-preservation.
36
134. See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 160-61
(2006) (describing the lack of privacy and degree of official control in prisons). There may be
ways to operate prisons with some modicum of respect-Whitman describes requirements in
European prisons that officers address prisoners in formal terms, or knock before entering cells-
but such requirements do not exist in American prisons. See WHITMAN, supra note 119, at 65-90.
135. See ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955) ("[W]e do not
make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or dig his own grave, or pull
the lever that springs the trap on which he stands.").
136. Larry May has reached a similar conclusion, with provisos: "Hobbes would think that
Socrates could have justifiably avoided his death sentence, as long as avoiding that sentence truly
did not threaten the legal order .... Hobbes does not say that it is justifiable to break any law the
breaking of which would not threaten the legal order. Rather, he holds the much more restricted
and reasonable view that this is only true in cases of peril to self." Larry May, Hobbes on Fidelity
to Law, 5 HOBBES STUD. 77, 86 (1992). I am not sure that this last provision is much of a
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Of course, the rhetoric of respect will never lead society to tolerate
criminals who, like Clyde Barrow, resist punishment by harming the state
officials who try to impose it. Violent resistance may be understandable if we
take the drive to self-preservation seriously, but societal interests demand that
this resistance not be condoned or overlooked. Nevertheless, the fact that
societies will condemn attacks on law enforcement officials need not end the
discussion of the right to resist punishment. Perhaps there are other, less
harmful, ways to resist. Were we to think of punishment in more Hobbesian
terms, we might understand constitutional and statutory rights of the accused
and the already-convicted as forms of legitimate, nonviolent resistance to
punishment.
The Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to testify against oneself
provides an excellent example. As noted above, scholars have strained to
explain the Fifth Amendment right as a service to innocent defendants, but not
everyone is convinced. 137 But from a more Hobbesian perspective, the right to
remain silent when questioned by would-be punishers is a logical corollary of
the fundamental right to preserve oneself; it matters little whether the right to
silence serves the innocent or helps the criminal justice system identify the
truly guilty. Indeed, the very phrase "self-incrimination" suggests a concern of
special importance to the guilty, who are presumably more likely to incriminate
themselves than the innocent. A privilege against self-incrimination is a
privilege of those who do have incriminating things to say-and its
constitutional status cannot be explained by a concern to protect innocents. The
relationship between a right to silence and a fight to resist punishment is made
especially clear by Hobbes's claim, echoed in contemporary constitutional
doctrine, that testimony can be compelled so long as the defendant is assured
immunity from punishment.
13 8
Defendants who choose to speak (or have others speak on their behalf),
rather than remain silent, sometimes might be understood as resisting
punishment. As noted above, the fight to present evidence in one's own defense
restriction, given that Hobbes considered any threat of "wounds, chains, or imprisonment" to pose
a peril to self-preservation. See supra text accompanying note 80. And Hobbes does not limit the
right to self-preservation to circumstances in which the legal order is not threatened; Hobbes does
not require the individual to sacrifice his own safety for the sake of the larger community.
137. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 113.
138. See HOBBES, supra note 18, at 151 ("If a man be interrogated by the sovereign ..
concerning a crime done by himself, he is not bound (without assurance of pardon) to confess it
. ... ) (emphasis added); see also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (upholding
federal law that permits compelled testimony provided the witness is promised that her statements
will not be used to prosecute her). Cf Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 376
U.S. 1, 180 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (tracing the privilege against self-incrimination to
Hobbes and the right to resist punishment). Michael Green has analyzed the Hobbesian argument
for a privilege against self-incrimination; he ultimately seems to conclude that a virtue-based or
republican political theory provides a non-contractual duty to obey the state that supplants
Hobbesian contractualism and precludes a privilege against self-incrimination. See Green, supra
note 8, at 675-80, 716.
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has been characterized as an essential element of due process and a key element
of the truth-seeking enterprise. 139 But we could explain this right as well or
better with an appeal to the concept of self-preservation: those who face
criminal charges and punishment have a right to try to exculpate themselves,
and proclamations of innocence are reasonable attempts to avoid
punishment.1 40 This fits within the Hobbesian view that there is no duty to
submit to punishment.
To be clear, the constitutional rights of the accused and convicted could
be understood as forms of permissible resistance to punishment, but these rights
are both less and more potent than Hobbes's version of the right to resist. They
are less potent, because they do not permit actual violent resistance. 141 They are
more potent, because they are enforceable. It would have been logically
contradictory for Hobbes's unified, absolute sovereign both to punish and to
protect a right of resistance, but our divided government permits the judiciary
to enforce certain forms of resistance to legislative or executive power.
Finally, I do not mean to deny the instrumentalist justifications for the
rights of the accused; some procedural rights do protect the innocent or assist in
distinguishing innocent defendants from guilty ones. But the rationales for
defendants' rights are not exhausted by the interests of the innocent or society
at large. In addition to whatever truth-seeking function the right to silence, the
right to present a defense, and other rights of the accused may serve, they are
also mechanisms of self-preservation. As such, they belong to the guilty as
much as the innocent.
CONCLUSION: RESISTING RESISTANCE
The account of punishment offered here will provoke resistance. When
punishment theorists speak of the state's right, or authority, to punish, they
usually rely on the Hohfeldian sense of right: a claim that implies a correlative
duty.142 If the state has a right to punish criminals, criminals ipso facto have a
duty to let themselves be punished. A Hobbesian theory disrupts this neat
marriage of right and duty. 143 It is my hope that the disruption will be a
productive one for punishment theory, one that will encourage refined accounts
of the relationship between the consent that allegedly legitimizes government
and the force that government exercises against the disobedient.
139. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
140. This principle was reflected in the now-defunct "exculpatory no" doctrine, which used
to serve as a defense to charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). Under that doctrine, a person was
excused from criminal liability if her only false statements to a federal officer were simple denials
of guilt. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 401-02 (1998) (describing, and rejecting, the
doctrine).
141. For example, the Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment
does not permit a prisoner to kill officials who punish him cruelly.
142. See Hohfeld, supra note 8, at 717.
143. See Curran, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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One potential objection to Hobbes, more pragmatic than philosophical,
posits that it is not in fact rational to resist punishment. It is foolish for an
individual to wage battle against the vast mechanisms of physical force
possessed by a modem state. If self-preservation is the individual's paramount
goal, it is better to accept non-capital punishment than to flee. Here one might
think of Victor Harris, who in 2001 attempted to flee a police cruiser and avoid
a speeding ticket.1 44 The ensuing high-speed chase ended when a sheriffs
deputy maneuvered his vehicle to hit Harris's car, sending Harris over an
embankment and leaving him a quadriplegic. 145 One newspaper account
attributed to Harris these "saddest words": "If only I had pulled over ... .,,146
There is little doubt that in a society like the contemporary United States, where
law enforcement officers wield the means of force and substantial discretion to
use it, physical resistance is usually not only futile but counterproductive.
47
But this pragmatic point does not diminish the power of Hobbes's claim that if
there is any hope of success, resistance is a rational human response.
More challenging to a Hobbesian understanding of punishment, in my
view, will be philosophical claims that humans cannot or should not preserve
themselves at the expense of membership in a community. Political thinkers
both before and after Hobbes have argued that human beings can exist and
thrive only in organized society. 148 Some may view the moral claims of
community as reasons to reject Hobbes's radical individualism and the right to
resist punishment that it implies. 149 Given, however, that contemporary liberal
political theory tends to endorse a fairly robust individualism, it may be fruitful
to see whether and how such individualism can respond to Hobbes's
challenges.
Finally, even those unpersuaded by Hobbes may find in him admirable
honesty and humility. In the many different theories advanced to justify
punishment as a political institution, one important variable is the ground the
theory claims to cover. Some theories purport to justify punishment completely,
so that the imposition of penalties is not an evil to be regretted but an
affirmative good-perhaps even a moral duty. Many retributive theories fall
144. See Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1772-73 (2007).
145. Id. at 1773. Harris sued the police deputy who pushed him over the embankment,
alleging an unconstitutional use of deadly force. Id. The Supreme Court found that the deputy was
entitled to summary judgment, basing its finding on a videotape of the chase. Id. at 1778-79.
146. James J. Kilpatrick, The Unhappy Lot of a Policeman, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 15, 2006,
at G5.
147. See Cover, supra note 7, at 1607-08 ("I think it is unquestionably the case in the
United States that most prisoners walk into prison because they know they will be dragged or
beaten ... if they do not walk. They do not organize force against being dragged because they
know that if they wage this kind of battle they will lose-very possibly lose their lives.").
148. Indeed, in his famous response to "the Foole," Hobbes himself made the point, though
he did not take it to undermine his argument for a right to self-preservation. See HOBBES, supra
note 18, at 101-03.
149. I thank Rick Greenstein for emphasizing this point.
2009]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
into this category.150 Other theories characterize punishment as a necessary
evil, a dirty activity that always leaves something to be regretted.15' Under this
second approach, social utility or other considerations may lead us to decide
that to impose punishment is better than to do nothing, but we must
acknowledge the damage that punishment inevitably does. Hobbes's theory
clearly belongs with the latter of these two options. Hobbes did not present
punishment as a completely legitimate political practice, though he viewed it as
a necessary and appropriate task. Punishment, on Hobbes's account, is never
actually authorized by every single subject-it is never authorized by the
individual who suffers it. For that individual, punishment is the rule of the
stronger, violence imposed by a person or persons with superior physical
might. Against such an imposition, it is only human to resist.
150. Scholars distinguish between mandatory or positive retributivism, which claims that
the guilty must be punished, and permissive retributivism, which holds that the guilty may be
punished. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the
Social Pyschology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1383 (2003). Kant's call to "execute the last
murderer" illustrates mandatory retributivism. See KANT, supra note 21.
151. See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 112 (Jane Grigson trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1964) (1764) ("It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them.").
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